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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from 
bond, credit default swap (CDS), equity and equity option prices. We analyse short term price 
discovery by modelling daily changes in credit spreads in the four markets with a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR). We also look at price discovery in the long run with a vector error 
correction model (VECM). We find that in the short term the option market clearly leads the other 
markets in the sub-prime crisis (2007-2009). During the less severe sovereign debt crisis (2009-2012) 
and the pre-crisis period, options are still important but CDSs become more prominent. In the long 
run, deviations from the equilibrium relationship with the option market still lead to adjustments in 
the credit spreads observed or implied from other markets. However, options no longer dominate 
price discovery in any of the periods considered. Our findings have implications for traders, credit risk 
managers and financial regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive literature shows the impact of credit risk on bond prices (early contributions in this area 
are Fisher, 1959, Johnson, 1967, Merton, 1974 and Sarig and Warga, 1989, among others) and recent 
research has started to single out and analyse a credit risk factor in stock prices (Dichev, 1998, 
Vassalou and Xing, 2004, Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). The important role of credit risk in 
securities prices has also led bank regulators to introduce new capital requirements that reflect the 
potential for credit risk related losses in traded instruments.
1
 In the light of recent events, it is 
important for financial economists, traders and regulators to identify the markets that incorporate 
credit risk related information most quickly and lead other markets in the price discovery process. 
Such information may give an early warning on imminent and possible large shocks in asset prices.
2
 
In addition, an understanding of the transmission mechanism of credit risk information across markets 
and its evolution over time may shed light on the relative efficiency of the markets and on the way 
their role changes in different market conditions. In this paper we investigate the discovery of the 
price of credit risk in the bond, CDS, stock and option markets over the period 2006-2012. 
The credit risk associated with a company may be measured in the credit market, via the credit spread 
of bonds issued by that company and via the price of CDSs written on those bonds. Indirectly, credit 
risk can also be quantified through implied credit spreads. Based on Merton (1974), Kealhofer (2003a 
and b) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) show how information on credit risk can be extracted from 
equity prices. Hull et al. (2005), Stamicar and Finger (2006) and Cao et al. (2011), on the other hand, 
show how to use the price of options written on a firm’s stock to obtain implied credit spreads.  
Several papers look at price discovery in the bond and CDS markets (e.g. Blanco et al., 2005 and Zhu, 
2006) and bond, CDS and stock markets (Longstaff et al., 2003, Norden and Weber, 2009 and Forte 
and Peña, 2009). However, the role of the option market in the price discovery of credit risk has 
attracted less attention. Recent research has found that the implied volatility of options written on 
stocks or stock futures can help explain credit spreads (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001, Cremers et al., 
2008, Berndt and Ostrovnaya, 2008, Cao et al., 2010 and Alexander and Kaeck, 2008). This is not 
surprising as banks and hedge funds routinely implement arbitrage trading strategies that are based on 
the discrepancies between the credit spreads implied from equity options and the spreads of bonds and 
                                                          
1
 In order to cope with increased migration risk, default clustering and loss of liquidity in crisis periods (which 
may negatively affect corporate bond prices as well as equity prices, among other securities), bank regulators 
have introduced an additional capital requirement for trading securities, namely the Incremental Risk Charge 
(IRC), which is based on a 1-year risk horizon and a 99.9% confidence level for Value-at-Risk estimations, 
similarly to the capital requirements on non-trading bank loans (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2009) 
2
 For example, Hamalainen et al. (2012) show how the market prices of credit default swaps (CDS), 
subordinated debt and equities and the implied volatility from option prices were useful early warning indicators 
of the financial problems at Northern Rock, which was eventually bailed out in September 2007. 
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CDS contracts for individual firms as shown in JPMorgan (2006) and Kapadia and Pu (2012).
3
 In 
particular, Kapadia and Pu (2012) find that equity and credit markets co-move and are fairly 
integrated over the long run. This suggests that, from the point of view of our analysis, they are both 
expected to have a significant role in the price discovery of credit risk. However, they also show that, 
in the short run, pricing discrepancies between equity and credit markets may persist because of 
constraints to arbitrage (such as liquidity and idiosyncratic risk). The implication is that an analysis of 
price discovery in the short run and long run may lead to different results.  
Based on previous findings, we expect CDS, bond, equity and option spreads to contribute to the price 
discovery of credit risk, and their informative role to be dependent on various factors related to the 
trading conditions that characterize each market. To the extent that information is incorporated into 
securities’ prices through trading activity, a strong link should exist between price discovery and 
trading-related variables such as trading volumes, bid-ask spreads and volatility. We would expect 
this pattern to differ in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, due to the effect the crisis had on the 
previously mentioned trading-specific variables. Chakravarty et al. (2004) investigate the price 
discovery in stock and option prices and find that price discovery is associated with high trading 
volume and narrow bid-ask spreads. Given our lack of data on trading volumes and transaction prices 
for all securities under analysis, we are unable to investigate the changing nature of trading activity in 
each market (which determines the changing patterns of price discovery documented in our work). 
We then limit our study to an investigation of the important empirical question of which market most 
timely incorporates credit-related information. 
  We add to the existing literature by (1) analysing, for the first time, all the markets that may 
contribute to the price discovery of credit risk, namely the bond, CDS, equity and option markets; (2) 
performing our analysis over an extended sample period including the 2007-2009 sub-prime crisis and 
the 2009-2012 sovereign debt crisis, which allows us to investigate changes in price discovery under 
different market conditions. We find that when we employ a vector autoregressive model (VAR) on 
daily credit spread changes to look at the price discovery in the short term, the option market clearly 
leads the others in the sub-prime crisis, that is the period of highest uncertainty in our sample (see 
Figure 1). However, during the less severe sovereign debt crisis (2009-2012) and the pre-crisis period, 
though options are still important, CDSs become the most prominent market. Interestingly, when we 
use a vector error correction specification (VECM) and consider how credit spreads adjusts to 
deviations from long run equilibrium relationships, options still influence other markets but no longer 
have a prominent role regardless of market conditions. We conclude that during periods of 
pronounced market dislocation, credit spreads react to shocks first registered in the option market but 
also to deviations from long term trends that are better captured in the other markets. Specifically, the 
                                                          
3
 These strategies do not ensure riskless profits as the traditional meaning of arbitrage implies, hence they are referred to as 
“risky arbitrage”. 
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CDS and equity markets lead the long run price discovery of credit spreads during both the pre-crisis 
period and the sovereign crisis period. However, the bond market becomes more influential in the 
sub-prime crisis and especially for the European sample of firms, where it appears to be the leading 
market. In our US sample, the CDS market leads long run price discovery during the sub-prime crisis.  
Our findings should be of interest to various market participants. Policymakers, concerned about the 
stability of the whole financial system, should benefit from a better understanding of how equities, 
bonds, options and credit derivatives are interlinked during periods of high and low volatility. Also, 
understanding which market contributes the most to price discovery becomes crucial to provide timely 
responses to systemic crises. Hedgers and arbitrageurs are also clearly interested in receiving the 
earliest possible signals of credit risk reversals.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature on credit 
risk price discovery. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and our methodology. In Section 5 and 6 we 
discuss the main results and robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
The literature on price discovery in credit spreads is relatively recent. Zhu (2006) analyses CDS and 
bond spreads and finds that CDSs lead price discovery in the US market. Another study on the 
relationship between the bond and CDS markets in Europe and the US is that of Blanco et al. (2005), 
concluding that the CDS market is responsible, on average, for about 80 percent of price discovery 
over their sample period. Das et al. (2012) show that the introduction of CDS trading undermines the 
efficiency and liquidity of the underlying corporate bond market. Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) find 
that price discovery in the CDS market decreased during the financial crisis of 2008 in favour of the 
bond market for a sample of US companies. Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Hilscher et al. (2013) 
study the information flow between CDS and equity markets for US individual obligors.  The former 
find evidence of insider trading in the CDS market during the 2001-2004 period, arguing that this 
could be a reason for the leading price discovery role of the CDS market against the equity market. 
However, this informational advantage is found only in the presence of negative credit news.  
HERE 
 
On the other hand, the latter study finds that equity returns predict CDS returns for a larger sample of 
firms over the period 2001-2007. Elkamhi et al. (2012) investigate how quickly earning 
announcements, changes in analyst recommendation and management guidance are incorporated into 
CDS spreads. Using logistic regressions, they find strong evidence that accounting information is 
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priced into CDS spreads on the day of the announcement, which suggests that the CDS market is 
characterized by an efficient price discovery process.   
Longstaff et al. (2003) are the first to jointly analyse the lead-lag relations between bonds, CDSs as 
well as stocks. They find that the CDS and equity markets lead the bond market most of the time. 
However, based on a study using a VAR, Norden and Weber (2009) find that the stock market is more 
likely to lead the other two markets and the CDS market appears to lead the bond market. The leading 
role of the CDS market on the bond market is also confirmed by the same authors with a bivariate 
VECM specification. The first study to analyse the three markets (CDS, bonds and equities) in a 
VECM framework is that of Forte and Peña (2009). They perform a price discovery analysis that is 
intuitively more appealing than in previous contributions as they compare homogeneous measures of 
credit risk in terms of observed or implied credit spreads obtained from the three markets. Their main 
finding is consistent with Norden and Weber (2009) in the sense that the stock market leads the price 
discovery process, followed by the CDS market.  
Early insights into the relevance of the option market (using option implied volatilities as determining 
factors of credit spreads) are given in the seminal paper of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). Their study 
finds that changes in the slope of the “smirk” of implied volatilities of options on S&P500 futures is a 
statistically significant explanatory variable for the changes in bond credit spreads. Results for 
individual companies were obtained by Cao et al. (2010) who find that the option-implied volatility of 
individual companies is important to explain single-name CDS spreads and its significance increases 
for companies characterised by high volatility in CDS spreads, low credit rating and large option 
trading volume. Similar results are found by Cremers et al. (2008), who confirm the importance of 
option-implied volatilities in explaining levels of bond credit spreads. They also find that the volatility 
skew of individual companies is significant, in line with the results of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). 
Another interesting study on the significance of the option market is that of Alexander and Kaeck 
(2008), who use Markov switching regressions to explain changes in European CDS indices in 
different regimes. Their main conclusion is that option-implied volatilities represent the main 
determinant of changes in CDS spreads in a volatile regime, whereas in stable conditions equity 
market returns have a predominant role.  
Lastly, Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) study how negative news is built into option prices, CDS 
spreads and stock prices. Following Acharya and Johnson (2007) they use predictive regression 
coefficients to the information flow across markets. They conclude that the flow of information in the 
CDS and option market works both ways. But, prior to some adverse market news, such as accounting 
scandals, the option market carries superior information. Using a similar methodology, Cao et al. 
(2010) find that option implied volatility innovations are more capable to predict future CDS spread 
changes than the other way around. However, both Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) and Cao et al. 
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(2010) do not convert the information from different markets into common and comparable credit risk 
measures, that is, credit spreads. Hence, they don’t take into account the long run equilibrium 
relationship that may exist among the spreads implied from the different markets. Furthermore, they 
do not consider the bond market which may be an important source of information in the price 
discovery process. 
 
3. Data 
In our analysis we use daily observations of CDS mid-quotes, bond yields, equity prices and option 
implied volatilities for a sample of 30 US and European non-financial companies from January 2006 
until December 2012. Our initial sample comprises the 300 largest US and European firms by market 
capitalization. Following Longstaff et al. (2003), we retain only those companies for which at least 
100 observations per year are simultaneously available, on the same dates, for the securities in the 
four markets considered. Out of the 300 selected firms, 264 are dropped due to insufficient bond data 
and 6 are eliminated because of lack of equity implied volatilities. Sample size has always been a 
problem in the price discovery literature on credit spreads, mainly due to missing data. Our study is 
the first that considers four markets at the same time, which means that additional missing values may 
further shorten the sample of dates available for the analysis and hence restrict the number of 
companies with sufficient observations across all the four markets. In addition, the use of a longer 
sample period imposes further restrictions due to the difficulty in finding bonds with desired maturity, 
for each firm, for the whole observation period.
4
 However, our final sample of non-financial 
companies compares favourably with previous studies both in terms of number of firms and length of 
the sample period analysed.
5
 
 
A. CDS and Bond Data 
CDS bid and ask quotes for various maturities are obtained from Datastream, who source their data 
from CMA. According to Mayordomo et al. (2013), CMA data on CDS are the best available as they 
lead the price discovery process if compared with other popular CDS datasets such as GFI, Fenics, 
Markit, JP Morgan and Reuters.
6
 Unfortunately, CMA data from Datastream are only available until 
the end of September 2010. Starting from October 2010 until the end of our sample, Datastream 
                                                          
4
 In particular, for most of the companies in our sample at least four bonds have to be used to generate a synthetic 5-year 
spread covering the whole sample period.  
5
 Sample sizes (number of non-financial companies) used in previous studies are: 39 in Norden and Weber (2009), 17 in 
Forte and Peña (2009), 18 in Blanco et al. (2005) and 16 in Zhu (2006). 
6
 This finding is particularly important to identify the true role of CDS in the price discovery analysis of credit spreads.  
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provides CDS quotes obtained from Thomson Reuters.
7
 We restrict our analysis to senior unsecured 
CDSs with 5 year maturity as they are the most liquid. For each of the companies, we use Bloomberg 
to find pairs of bonds which (1) are denominated in US dollars for US firms and Euros for European 
firms, (2) are senior unsecured, (3) have “generic” Bloomberg mid-market prices, that is, average 
quotes from at least five brokers or dealers; (4) are not floating-rate and do not have embedded 
options or any special features; (5) one bond has a maturity below 5 years while the other has a 
maturity above 5 years.
8
 We then construct synthetic 5-year credit spreads for each company by 
taking the difference between the synthetic 5-year yield (obtained by linear interpolation of the pair of 
bonds) and the corresponding risk free rate (downloaded from Bloomberg). In particular, we use the 
5-year swap rates for US dollars and Euros which are regarded as the best proxy for the risk free rate 
(see Hull et al., 2005 and Houweling and Vorst, 2005).  
 
B. Equity and Option Data 
We employ the CreditGrades structural model to estimate the 5-year equity implied spreads. The 
model is widely used by both researchers and practitioners. Recent studies that have employed this 
model are Duarte et al. (2007) and Yu (2006). A summary of its main features is presented in the 
Appendix. In order to implement CreditGrades, we need the following inputs for each company: daily 
series of stock prices and market capitalizations; accounting data including short-term and long-term 
liabilities, minority interest, preferred shares; the mean global recovery rate (on each firm’s debt of 
any seniority) L and its standard deviation λ; the recovery rate of the firm’s senior unsecured debt, R; 
the annualized equity volatility σS and the 5-year risk-free interest rate r. 
Stock prices, market capitalisations, accounting data and 5-year swap rates are downloaded from 
Bloomberg. For L  and λ we take the estimated values of 0.5 and 0.3, respectively, reported in the 
CreditGrades Technical Document (2002), which are based on historical data of about 300 non-
financial companies. The recovery rate R is estimated as the Moody’s average historical recovery rate 
on senior unsecured debt over the period 1982-2009 (see Moody’s 2011) and is equal to 0.326. As a 
proxy for the risk-free rate, we use again the 5-year swap rates. To estimate the equity volatility σS we 
follow the CreditGrades Technical Document (2002). However, while CreditGrades employs a 1,000-
day moving average of past equity stock returns
9
, we resort to a 40-day moving average to improve 
the volatility’s responsiveness to changing market conditions. This is consistent with the shorter time 
                                                          
7
 Datastream reports Thomson Reuters CDS historical data from 2007. 
8
 For most of the companies, we calculate 5-year spreads via linear interpolation. However, for some of them and for only a 
small part of the sample period, we could not find enough bonds with maturity above 5 years so we had to resort to linear 
extrapolation.  
9
 Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) use a 250-day rolling window to estimate the equity returns’ 
volatility in their implementation of the Merton model. 
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span (2 months) used to obtain option implied volatilities for the estimation of option implied spreads, 
which is discussed next.  
In order to estimate the 5-year option implied spreads, we use an extended version of the 
CreditGrades model as described in Stamicar and Finger (2006). To implement the model we only 
need daily implied volatilities for 2-month equity at-the-money put options which we obtain from 
Bloomberg.  
Matching the four series of spreads for each company leaves us with a final sample of 30 firms, 11 of 
which are based in the US, while the remaining 19 are European. The large downsizing in the number 
of firms available for our study (from 300 to 30) is mostly due to lack of bond data.  
In the analysis that follows we split our sample into a pre-crisis sub-sample which starts in January 
2006 and ends in July 2007, a sub-prime crisis sub-sample that begins in August 2007 and lasts until 
the end of July 2009 and a sample including the most recent sovereign debt crisis, which goes from 
August 2009 and ends in December 2012. We set August 1
st
, 2007 as the starting time of the sub-
prime crisis because the cost of insurance against default for several companies doubled in that 
month. We set August 1
st
, 2009 as the starting time of the sovereign debt crisis because the first signs 
of market instability in sovereign credit spreads occurred in the second half of 2009. 
Descriptive statistics of the four series of credit spreads are shown in Table 1. We report the 10%, 
50%, 90% quantiles, the number of observations and the standard deviation of credit spread levels. 
We also report these statistics by region (US and Europe) and sample periods. The most evident 
difference across median values is the large discrepancy between bond and CDS spreads on one side 
and equity and option implied spreads on the other. This is further confirmation of the well-known 
“credit spread puzzle” that has been widely documented in the literature (see, for example, Jones et 
al., 1984, Eom et al., 2004, Huang and Huang, 2012,  Ericsson et al., 2005, Collin-Dufresne et al., 
2001 and Kapadia and Pu, 2012) and highlights how structural credit risk models based on the work 
of Merton (1974) (like the ones used to generate equity and option implied spreads) tend to produce 
spreads far below those observed in the bond market. Although the structural models behind equity 
and option implied spreads may not fully explain the level of credit spreads observed in the bond and 
CDS markets, it is not unreasonable to expect that they may provide market participants with useful 
price discovery signals as shown by previous studies (see, for instance, Forte and Peña, 2009). 
Table 1 also reveals that the 90% quantiles of equity and option implied spreads are larger than the 
corresponding ones for bonds and CDSs. Upon close inspection, we notice that the larger high 
quantile spreads of equity and option markets occur only during the sub-prime crisis. This may be due 
to the short rolling window (of 40 days) used for the estimation of the equity implied spreads. The 
short window enables us to obtain spreads that react promptly to changing market conditions. As a 
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result, low equity implied spreads are produced in the period preceding the crisis
10
 and remarkably 
high spreads in the crisis period due to the occurrence of large negative shocks to the equity prices. 
The same applies to option implied spreads as they have been estimated with short maturity (2-month) 
equity put options. Figure 1 shows daily cross sectional median spreads obtained from the four 
markets. We can clearly see how the sub-prime crisis period is characterised by the highest volatility 
in the four markets. 
In order to get a first grasp of the interactions across the four markets, Table 2 reports the pairwise 
contemporaneous correlations of daily credit spread changes. In general, as one would expect, they 
are always positive except in one case. If we focus on the whole sample period, they are in the range 
of 0.03 (between CDS and option implied spreads) and 0.17 (for the correlation of CDS and bond 
spreads), which is similar to the order of magnitude reported by Norden and Weber (2009) for the 
correlations of their daily time series of CDS and bond spread changes.   
Furthermore, we perform a unit root test on the time series of credit spreads. We apply three different 
tests to check whether the credit spread series are non-stationary. In particular, we use the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test and the Phillips-
Perron test. We find, in line with previous literature, that the hypothesis of non-stationarity for the 
levels of credit spreads is rejected only in very few cases at the 5% level of significance. Hence, our 
subsequent analysis is based on first-differenced series of spreads, which are no longer non-stationary. 
 
4. Methodology 
To determine which market is the “first to move”, i.e. which market anticipates the credit spread 
changes observed in or implied from the other markets, we first employ a VAR model. This allows us 
to analyse the short-run dynamics of the price discovery process. Next, as credit spreads from the four 
markets should be linked in the long term as they represent prices of credit risk for the same firm, we 
also employ a VECM specification. Following an approach similar to Norden and Weber (2009), we 
perform an aggregate analysis to find out whether some markets, on average, lead the price discovery 
process of credit spreads. Then, in order to separate time series effects from the cross sectional effects, 
and hence allow the regression coefficients to change across firms, we also run the models on a firm-
by-firm basis. 
The first step of our analysis is to apply a VAR model to describe changes in credit spreads for the 
four markets as given below: 
                                                          
10
 This means that large negative shocks are absent in the pre-crisis sub-sample and keep implied spreads from increasing. 
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where ε1t, ε2t, ε3t, ε4t  are i.i.d. error terms and CDS, BCS, EIS and OIS indicate CDS mid-quotes, bond 
credit spreads, equity implied spreads and option implied spreads, respectively. 
Subsequently, to analyse whether the CDS, bond, equity and option markets are linked via a long run 
equilibrium relation, we also employ a VECM model. The model is specified as follows: 
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where ε1t, ε2t, ε3t, ε4t  are i.i.d. error terms. The iCE  terms are cointegration equations defined as: 
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1211111   tt OISCDSCE                                                                                    (9) 
1221212   tt OISBCSCE                                                                                             (10) 
1231313   tt OISEISCE  ,                                                                                            (11) 
We define the three cointegration equations as in (9) to (11) where long run relationship are measured 
in relation to the option market because we are particularly interested in analysing the role of the 
option market (against the other markets) in the price discovery of credit risk, which has been the 
focus on recent research (e.g. Alexander and Kaeck, 2008, Berndt and Ostrovnaya, 2008, and Cao et 
al. 2010). In order to quantify the share of the price discovery attributable to each market, we follow 
Norden and Weber (2009) and rely on the measure of price discovery introduced by Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995). 
The general representation in equations (5) to (11) only applies to the companies for which the 
maximum number of cointegrating equations (three) is found. To determine the contribution to price 
discovery of the various markets, one can focus on the statistical significance and sign of the error 
correction coefficients λ’s. For instance, if the option market leads the discovery of the price of credit 
risk, the λij’s in equations (5) to (7), will be negative and statistically significant as all the other three 
markets will adjust when they deviate from the option market. On the other hand, if the option market 
is the least important in the price discovery process then all the λ’s in equation (8) will be positive and 
statistically significant as the option market adjusts when it deviates from the other markets. If all λij’s  
in equations (5) to (7) and all the λ’s in equation (8) are significant and with the signs indicated above, 
then price discovery takes place, to some degree, in all markets. This above is summarised in Table 3. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Price discovery: the short-run dynamics 
We use a VAR model, as defined in equations (1) to (4), to investigate the short-run dynamics of 
credit spreads price discovery in terms of lead-lags relationships. Each variable in the system is 
treated as endogenous and lead-lags effects can be captured by examining the significance of the 
coefficients of each explanatory variable. Firstly, we estimate the VAR model in a fixed effect panel 
framework in order to verify whether on aggregate it is possible to identify any leading market. The 
selection of the number of lags for each variable is based on the Schwartz criterion. Results are shown 
in Table 4. From the panel regression it is difficult to detect general patterns, with few exceptions. We 
can see that lagged CDS spread changes systematically lead spread changes in the bond market in all 
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periods and that bond and equity spread changes are the only ones to be consistently autocorrelated in 
all periods.   
A more insightful analysis can be performed when we separate the cross sectional from the time series 
effects in the panel. We do so by estimating a VAR model for each firm in our sample and by running 
Granger causality tests to determine the leading behaviour of the markets under consideration. Results 
are presented in Table 5, where we show the number of cases for which the lagged coefficients of 
individual markets are jointly different from zero. The last column shows the total number of 
instances in which a market Granger causes the one of the other markets. We can see that in 46 
instances the option market leads another market during the sub-prime crisis, followed by the equity 
and bond market (with 33 and 32 firms, respectively). The dominance of the option market appears to 
be driven by its strong influence on the equity market. Options exhibit a strong short term leading 
behaviour also in the pre-crisis period and the sovereign debt crisis where, however, it ranks second 
after the CDS market in both instances. The overall picture from Table 5 is that the degree of 
interdependence among markets, as measured by lead-lag relationships at the firm level, increases 
substantially in times of high uncertainty. The number of occasions in which a market Granger causes 
another grows from 60 in the pre-crisis period to more than double that amount (137) in the sub-prime 
crisis and by 80% (108) in the sovereign debt crisis.  
5.2 Price discovery: the long-run dynamics 
In this section we analyse how credit spreads react to deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
relationship among credit spreads obtained from the four markets. One way to do so when credit 
spreads are non-stationary is to introduce an error correction term in the VAR model and estimate a 
standard VECM. The results of the Johansen cointegration test for each of the 30 companies in our 
sample shows that the maximum number of cointegrating relationships (that is three) is found for 20 
firms (out of 30).
11
 We then focus our attention on these 20 companies to study the long run price 
discovery for the four markets.
12
 Specifically, we analyse the coefficients on the error correction terms 
introduced in equations (5) to (8).  
Similarly to the previous VAR analysis, we first report aggregate results for a VECM estimated as a 
panel, which includes all companies in our restricted sample of 20 firms. Coefficient estimates and 
corresponding p-values are shown in Table 6. The interpretation of the error correction coefficients to 
make inference on long run price discovery is summarised in Table 3. From Table 6 we observe that 
in the pre-crisis period (Panel A) option spreads adjust to both CDS spreads and equity implied 
spreads as λ41 and λ43 are both highly significant. We also find that options lead bonds as λ42 is 
insignificant, whereas λ22 is highly significant. During the sub-prime crisis (Panel B), the option 
                                                          
11
 Results of the Johansen test are available on request. 
12
 Note that of these 20 firms, 10 are based in Europe, whilst the remaining 10 are US-based. 
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market leads the equity market while option and bonds contribute to the long run price discovery of 
each other. We do not find evidence of option implied credit spreads and CDS spreads reacting to 
temporary divergences between the two markets. In the sovereign crisis (Panel C), options lead both 
CDS and bond markets as λ11 and λ22 are significant. The main conclusion to draw from the VECM 
analysis seems to be that is that the option market has an important role in influencing price formation 
in other markets in periods of stress.  
However, the above analysis gives only a partial picture of market interactions because (i) as 
mentioned before, time series and cross-sectional effects are co-mingled and (ii) long run price 
discovery is analysed from the point of view of the option market. To address (i) we run a VECM at 
the firm level. Results are shown in Table 7 Panel A. Median lambdas across firms again support our 
previous conclusions with the option market having a dominant role: in the sub-prime crisis relative to 
all other markets, and in the sovereign crisis with respect to CDS and bonds. We then tackle (ii) by 
estimating a Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measure of long run price discovery by taking into account the 
leading behaviour of each market in relation to every other market (not only the option market). GG 
measures are reported in Table 7 Panel B. Here the conclusions are rather different and surprising. 
Price discovery in the sub-prime crisis is led by bonds and CDSs whereas in the sovereign crisis and 
the pre-crisis period the leaders are CDSs and equities. A combined interpretation of Panel A and B 
leads us to conclude that although options may lead credit risk assessments in other markets in periods 
of high uncertainty, the information contained in them is not the only signal that affects credit spread 
changes in other markets when we look at long run dynamics. Results on the GG measure reveal that 
deviations from the long run relationship with option implied spreads, although accounted for and 
often significant, are not the most important contributing factor to credit risk price formation. This is 
in sharp contrast to our VAR results on short run price discovery and add a different dimension to our 
VECM results.   
5.3 Comments  
One of the findings of our analysis refers to the increasing role of the bond market in the price 
discovery, both short term and long term, during the sub-prime crisis. This may be related to the 
liquidity problems faced by market participants during the recent financial crisis, as they were forced 
to deleverage their corporate bond positions to re-pay their short term exposures, as discussed in Bai 
and Collin-Dufresne (2011).  
The dramatic fall in the price discovery of the equity market during the crisis revealed by the GG 
measure may be due to a substantial increase in hedging costs. Das and Hanouna (2009) show that 
equity hedging costs increase when markets are volatile. When stock prices fall, hedge ratios rise, thus 
determining an increase in hedging costs, worsened by the presence of frictions such as illiquidity in 
the equity market. This could be a reason why, under such circumstances, professional investors may 
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channel their trades via different trading venues such as bond, CDS and option markets. A second 
possible reason for the lesser role of the equity market relative to the other markets during the crisis 
may be related to the presence of informed trading and insider trading documented for the derivatives 
markets by Pan and Poteshman (2006) and Acharya and Johnson (2007). In particular, the former 
study focuses on the option market and documents how information on option trading volumes could 
help predict the future movements of equity prices, which supports a greater importance of options in 
the price formation process. The latter study highlights how insider trading could be the reason for the 
superiority of the CDS market over the equity market in terms of information revelation in the 
presence of negative credit news. However, although the above offers a plausible explanation for our 
long run price discovery results, it is unclear why they are contradicted by our price discovery 
findings in the short run where equities appear to be an important market alongside bonds during the 
sub-prime crisis.  
If we focus on the long run relationships alone, the dominant role of both the CDS and equity markets 
during stable periods is in line with the results of Longstaff et al. (2003). Forte and Peña (2009) and 
Norden and Weber (2009) find a clear leading role for the equity market. However, these studies have 
not considered the option market in their analyses. Our findings support those of Berndt and 
Ostrovnaya (2008) and Cao et al. (2010), who document the importance of the information flow from 
the option market to the CDS and equity markets. Finally, our results are in line with those of Zhu 
(2006) and Blanco et al. (2005), who observe that in the pre-crisis period the bond market is 
dominated by the CDS market in terms of price discovery.  
 
6. Robustness tests 
We analyse the US and European samples separately in order to investigate whether the price 
discovery process is robust across regions. Results from the firm-by-firm VECM are reported in Table 
8. By focusing on the pairwise analysis between option spreads and spreads derived from other 
markets, Panel A and C (on error correction coefficients) shows that, for both the US and European 
firms, results are very similar to those reported in Table 7 for the whole sample.  
Some differences arise when we investigate the joint price discovery of the four markets with the GG 
measure (Panels B and D of Table 8). In particular, the main differences (as compared with the results 
in Table 7) relate to the sub-prime crisis. While the bond market is the most important one in the 
European sample, it is the CDS market that has a leading role in the US. However, in general, the 
price discovery of bonds increases during this sub-period, in line with what has been documented by 
Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011). We also note that during the pre-crisis period the option market 
seems to have a greater share of price discovery in Europe than in the US market. This is consistent 
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with the leading role of options over equities in the short term found with the VAR analysis. Indeed, 
in Panel A of Table 5, 10 of the 12 significant lagged changes of option spreads that are statistically 
significant in explaining changes in equity spreads, are due to European companies included in our 
analysis.  
We do an additional robustness test by splitting the third sub-sample (between August 2009 and 
December 2012), which includes the sovereign debt crisis, into 2 sub-periods. Our purpose is to 
isolate the periods of low volatility for corporate spreads from the periods of high volatility 
corresponding to the heat of the sovereign debt crisis. For example, by observing Figure 1 more 
closely, we notice that from August 2010 until July 2011, the option market as represented by our 
sample of companies experienced a period of low volatility. From August 2011 till the end of our 
sample, there is a marked increase in volatility. We then re-run our analysis separately for these two 
sub-periods to see whether we can identify any differences in the price discovery behaviour of 
corporate credit spreads. We find that the results for the two sub-periods are qualitatively similar to 
those in Table 7. Hence, we conclude that our results obtained during the longer sovereign crisis 
sample are valid for the entire duration of this sub-period.  
Finally, we also re-compute equity implied spreads by using a 250-day historical volatility (in 
addition to the 40-day rolling window) as in Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Vassalou and Xing 
(2004) and we run again a VAR panel regression which includes all firms in our sample. The results 
do not differ qualitatively from those obtained in Table 4.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the price discovery in credit spreads obtained or implied from the option, CDS, 
bond and equity markets. In our analysis we distinguish between short term and long term price 
discovery in the four markets. Short term price discovery measures indicate that the option market 
clearly influences credit risk pricing in the other markets in periods of highest uncertainty. In calmer 
conditions, even though options are still important, CDSs become the dominant market. When we 
look at the influence on credit spread changes of deviations from long run equilibrium relationships 
across markets, options are still important but no longer have a prominent role regardless of market 
conditions. Specifically, CDSs and equities lead the long run price discovery of credit spreads during 
the pre-crisis period and the sovereign crisis. However, the bond market becomes more influential in 
the sub-prime crisis and especially in our European sample, where it appears as the leading market. In 
our US sample, the CDS market leads the long run price discovery during the sub-prime crisis.  
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Relative to previous research, by focusing simultaneously on all markets that have been identified as 
containing information on credit spreads, our analysis gives a fuller characterisation of the process 
that leads to the formation of the price for credit risk. Interestingly, our Granger causality tests show 
the presence of strong interlinkages across markets especially during the sub-prime crisis. Overall, it 
is difficult to draw overarching conclusions except that the price discovery of credit spreads changes 
quite substantially over time, across regions and across reference entities. This implies, for example, 
that hedging or trading strategies based on pre-determined interactions among the above markets may 
only have short lived validity. An interesting line of future research could focus on the occasional 
discrepancies that can be observed between short term and long term price discovery behaviour. A 
greater understanding of this puzzling evidence, especially in crisis periods, could help us devise more 
effective leading indicators of market turbulence. 
 
Appendix 
CreditGrades Model 
According to the model, the recovery rate L  follows a lognormal distribution with mean L  and 
standard deviation λ where 
 LEL   and                                                                                                                           (A1) 
 )log(2 LVar , such that                                                                                                       (A2) 
2/2  ZDeLLD ,                     (A3)  
where L  is the mean global recovery rate,   is the percentage standard deviation of the default 
barrier, D  is the company’s debt-per-share and Z  is a standard normal random variable which is 
known at the time of default only. 
The debt-per-share D  is based on financial data from consolidated statements and is defined as the 
ratio of liabilities to the number of outstanding shares issued by a specific firm, where liabilities are 
defined as follows: 
InterestMinorityDebtFinancialsLiabilitie __   and                (A4) 
)__(*5.0_ LTDebtOtherSTDebtOtherLTDebtSTDebtDebtFinancial             (A5) 
where InterestMinority _  represents the portion of the stock of subsidiary corporations not owned 
by the parent company; STDebt  and LTDebt  are short-term and long-term interest-bearing 
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obligations; STDebtOther _  and LTDebtOther _  are short-term and long-term obligations that do 
not bear explicit interest. 
The number of outstanding shares is defined as the sum of common shares and preferred shares: 
sharespreferredsharescommonsharesNumber ___  , where             (A6) 
S
capmarket
sharescommon
_
_  , and                 (A7) 
S
equitypreferred
sharespreferred
_
_                  (A8) 
capmarket_  and equitypreferred _  represent the current market capitalization and the book value 
of the preferred shares, respectively. S  is the price of the common stock. The final formula for the 
debt-per-share D  is then given by: 
sharesNumber
sLiabilitie
D
_
                      (A9) 
The company’s asset value is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion: 
t
t
t dWdt
V
dV
                                                                                                                             (A10) 
where   is the asset drift,   is the asset volatility and W  is a standard Brownian motion. 
The survival probability of the company at any time t is given by the probability that the asset value 
(A10) does not hit the barrier defined in (A3) before time t: 
)
)log(
2
()
)log(
2
()(
t
t
t
t
A
dA
d
A
dA
tP                                                                       (A11)  
where  
DL
eV
d
2
0

  and                                                                                                                        (A12) 
222   tAt .
                                                                                                                         (A13)   
The asset value and asset volatility can be proxied by market observables parameters. In fact, it can be 
assumed that at time t = 0: 
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DLSV   and                                                                                                                     (A14) 
DLS
S
S

                                                                                                                        (A15) 
such that (A12) and (A13) can be written as: 
2e
DL
DLS
d

 and                                                                                                               (A16) 
222 )(  

 t
DLS
S
A St                                                                                                       (A17) 
where 
S  is the stock volatility. Finally, the survival probability is converted to a credit spread as 
follows: 
1 (0) ( ( ) ( ))
(1 )
(0) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
r
rt r
P e G t G
EIS r R
P P t e e G t G


 
 
   
 
   
                                                           (A18) 
where 
2
2


                                                                                                                       (A19)     
and, following Rubinstein and Reiner (1991),  
)
)log(
()
)log(
()( 2/12/1 uz
u
d
duz
u
d
duG zz 



                                           (A20) 
with 
2/24/1 rz  .                                                                                                    (A21) 
In particular, an estimate of the asset volatility can be obtained by using the following relationship:
13
 
(1 )
rt
S
LDe
S
                                                                                                                 (A22) 
where 
S  is a daily time series of at-the-money equity option implied volatilities. By inverting the 
formula and solving for the unknown asset volatility  , we can calculate an option-implied spread 
(OIS) by using again equation (A18).  
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Table 1. Summary statistics for credit spread levels 
This table reports summary statistics for the time series of daily credit spreads obtained from the CDS, bond, equity and option markets. In particular, we report the 10%, 50% 
and 90% quantiles and the standard deviation (SD). We also differentiate by sub-period and region. Data on spreads are in basis points and are based on a sample of 30 firms. 
10%, 50% and 90% indicate quantiles of the distribution of credit spreads.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Contemporaneous correlation of credit spreads changes  
This table reports average Pearson correlation coefficients (ρ) estimated for changes of credit spreads obtained from the credit default swap market (CDS), the bond market 
(BCS), the equity market (EIS) and the option market (OIS). We differentiate by sub-period and region. 
  CDSs Bonds Equities Options 
Obs. 10% 50% 90% StDev 10% 50% 90% StDev 10% 50% 90% StDev 10% 50% 90% StDev 
Sample Pre-crisis period 11373 9.00 23.40 72.50 127.07 2.85 22.97 75.26 65.41 0.00 0.45 86.79 306.73 0.00 1.68 64.07 314.50 
 Sub-prime crisis 13820 32.00 86.00 343.80 657.85 21.85 102.65 389.05 300.56 0.32 63.55 1032.1 938.32 0.58 64.79 859.41 606.86 
 Sovereign crisis 22443 46.74 89.19 361.54 153.25 21.56 73.89 342.44 145.26 0.05 20.45 356.94 189.74 0.18 26.66 353.48 382.54 
 All 47636 19.50 70.50 310.00 379.10 11.41 61.62 315.42 200.35 0.01 14.51 453.20 555.38 0.04 20.52 416.20 454.70 
                   
Region US 14928 14.00 56.01 604.29 652.31 6.37 61.75 501.81 317.20 0.00 9.15 788.79 546.50 0.00 15.94 703.39 670.28 
 Europe 32708 23.00 76.16 203.11 95.65 15.22 61.59 221.83 95.28 0.04 17.12 386.54 556.15 0.17 22.03 340.28 299.89 
  ρ (ΔCDS,ΔBCS) ρ (ΔCDS,ΔEIS) ρ (ΔCDS,ΔOIS) ρ (ΔBCS,ΔEIS) ρ (ΔBCS,ΔOIS) ρ (ΔEIS,ΔOIS)  
Sample Pre-crisis period 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.53 
 Sub-prime crisis 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.19 
 Sovereign crisis 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 
 All 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.10 
        
Region US 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.06 
 Europe 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.16 
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Table 3. Long run price discovery: interpretation of error correction coefficients. 
The table shows how lambda coefficients in the VECM model, equations (5) to (8) should be interpreted to do 
inference about long run price discovery. 
 
Option market leads  
CDS   not significant
Bond   not significant
Equity   not significant
 
Option market follows 
CDS  not significant 
Bond  not significant 
Equity  not significant 
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Table 4. Aggregate price discovery analysis: VAR results 
This table reports results obtained from the estimation of a VAR fixed-effect panel regression on daily changes 
in credit spreads from the credit default swap market (CDS), the bond market (BCS), the equity market (EIS) 
and the option market (OIS), based on equations (1) – (4). Regressions are estimated on a sample of 30 firms 
over three different periods, which include a pre-crisis period (January 2006 – July 2007), the sub-prime crisis 
(August 2007 – July 2009) and the sovereign crisis (August 2009 - December 2012). P-values less than 5% are 
indicated in bold. 
Dep.Var. 
∆CDSt ∆BCSt ∆EISt ∆OISt 
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period  
∆CDSt-1 -0.17 0.069 0.05 0.184 -0.11 0.181 -0.05 0.608 
∆CDSt-2 -0.11 0.115 0.06 0.107 -0.15 0.080 0.03 0.800 
∆CDSt-3 -0.08 0.270 0.10 0.000 -0.00 0.995 0.05 0.708 
∆CDSt-4 -0.09 0.237 0.09 0.008 0.18 0.041 0.30 0.004 
∆BCSt-1 0.09 0.005 -0.53 0.000 0.05 0.234 0.11 0.024 
∆BCSt-2 0.07 0.050 -0.31 0.000 0.06 0.196 0.10 0.086 
∆BCSt-3 0.09 0.054 -0.14 0.000 0.01 0.792 0.04 0.620 
∆BCSt-4 0.07 0.029 -0.09 0.005 -0.06 0.258 -0.07 0.259 
∆EISt-1 0.07 0.002 0.04 0.003 0.06 0.234 0.20 0.001 
∆EISt-2 0.01 0.706 0.02 0.144 0.00 0.926 0.02 0.707 
∆EISt-3 0.00 0.799 0.01 0.519 -0.07 0.019 -0.05 0.236 
∆EISt-4 0.07 0.015 0.02 0.121 0.03 0.329 0.06 0.178 
∆OISt-1 0.04 0.040 0.01 0.113 0.01 0.742 -0.23 0.000 
∆OISt-2 0.00 0.936 0.01 0.127 0.04 0.123 -0.09 0.041 
∆OISt-3 0.02 0.267 0.00 0.752 0.01 0.727 -0.05 0.268 
∆OISt-4 -0.01 0.541 -0.00 0.705 -0.01 0.666 -0.06 0.101 
Const. 0.03 0.592 -0.05 0.414 -0.01 0.918 -0.07 0.620 
         
Obs. 9501  9501  9501  9501  
R2 0.085  0.243  0.030  0.061 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-prime crisis  
∆CDSt-1 0.13 0.447 0.11 0.028 -0.10 0.102 0.03 0.823 
∆CDSt-2 0.25 0.035 0.11 0.001 0.04 0.277 0.07 0.267 
∆CDSt-3 0.13 0.319 0.04 0.258 -0.01 0.730 0.02 0.775 
∆CDSt-4 0.12 0.347 0.04 0.108 0.01 0.659 0.00 0.957 
∆BCSt-1 0.19 0.004 -0.21 0.002 -0.02 0.668 0.31 0.003 
∆BCSt-2 0.00 0.987 -0.07 0.202 0.04 0.539 0.27 0.057 
∆BCSt-3 -0.07 0.432 -0.05 0.229 0.12 0.027 0.34 0.038 
∆BCSt-4 -0.14 0.122 0.00 0.947 0.09 0.095 0.13 0.298 
∆EISt-1 0.02 0.048 -0.00 0.910 0.22 0.140 -0.53 0.223 
∆EISt-2 0.01 0.620 -0.00 0.759 0.20 0.033 -0.13 0.660 
∆EISt-3 -0.00 0.900 -0.00 0.799 -0.02 0.768 0.05 0.729 
∆EISt-4 -0.01 0.170 0.00 0.756 0.14 0.027 -0.17 0.361 
∆OISt-1 -0.00 0.883 0.01 0.239 0.18 0.016 -0.04 0.859 
∆OISt-2 -0.01 0.050 0.01 0.094 0.13 0.000 -0.03 0.800 
∆OISt-3 -0.01 0.025 0.01 0.135 0.01 0.844 -0.09 0.360 
∆OISt-4 -0.00 0.527 0.00 0.270 -0.00 0.758 0.02 0.662 
Const. 0.23 0.568 0.41 0.121 0.16 0.864 1.78 0.404 
         
Obs. 11329  11329  11329  11329  
R2 0.160  0.076  0.307  0.110 
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Table 4 – continued 
 
 
Panel C: Sovereign crisis  
∆CDSt-1 0.08 0.045 0.29 0.000 0.02 0.617 0.03 0.829 
∆CDSt-2 0.04 0.281 0.16 0.000 0.05 0.288 0.20 0.412 
∆CDSt-3 -0.01 0.731 0.12 0.000 -0.03 0.512 -0.13 0.231 
∆CDSt-4 -0.03 0.321 0.09 0.008 0.00 0.908 -0.11 0.273 
∆BCSt-1 0.01 0.251 -0.49 0.000 0.05 0.114 -0.05 0.211 
∆BCSt-2 0.00 0.807 -0.20 0.000 0.06 0.056 0.01 0.829 
∆BCSt-3 -0.01 0.219 -0.11 0.000 0.02 0.347 -0.06 0.125 
∆BCSt-4 -0.01 0.205 -0.02 0.301 0.01 0.482 -0.04 0.255 
∆EISt-1 0.01 0.109 0.01 0.301 0.03 0.097 -0.01 0.757 
∆EISt-2 0.01 0.289 0.01 0.219 0.05 0.005 0.07 0.300 
∆EISt-3 0.01 0.416 0.01 0.213 0.06 0.039 -0.03 0.477 
∆EISt-4 0.00 0.931 0.00 0.596 0.01 0.508 0.01 0.735 
∆OISt-1 0.00 0.150 0.00 0.779 0.00 0.480 0.09 0.363 
∆OISt-2 -0.00 0.097 0.00 0.191 0.00 0.402 -0.31 0.178 
∆OISt-3 0.00 0.204 0.00 0.143 0.00 0.494 0.05 0.416 
∆OISt-4 0.00 0.641 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.528 -0.04 0.451 
Const. 0.04 0.758 -0.15 0.198 -0.07 0.676 -0.66 0.216 
         
Obs. 17088  17088  17088  17088  
R2 0.018  0.205  0.015  0.223  
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Table 5. Granger causality test from firm-specific VAR 
This table reports the number of firms for which we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level that lags 1 to 4 
for a particular market have no explanatory power. We perform the test after estimating firm-specific VARs on 
daily changes in credit default swap spreads (CDS), bond credit spreads (BCS), equity implied spreads (EIS) 
and option implied spreads (OIS) over the pre-crisis period (January 2006 – July 2007), the sub-prime crisis 
(August 2007 – July 2009) and the sovereign crisis period (August 2009 - December 2012), as in equations (1) – 
(4).  
Dep. Var. ∆CDSt ∆BCSt ∆EISt ∆OISt Sum 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period   
        
 
   
 - 11 7 8 26 
        
 
   
 3 - 1 2 6 
        
 
   
 5 4 - 2 11 
        
 
   
 3 2 12 - 17 
    Total 60 
Panel B: Sub-prime crisis   
        
 
   
 - 13 8 5 26 
        
 
   
 9 - 10 13 32 
        
 
   
 12 10 - 11 33 
        
 
   
 11 11 24 - 46 
    Total 137 
Panel C: Sovereign crisis   
        
 
   
 - 19 9 10 38 
        
 
   
 6 - 4 9 19 
        
 
   
 3 5 - 10 18 
        
 
   
 15 6 12 - 33 
    Total 108 
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Table 6. Aggregate price discovery analysis: VECM results 
This table reports results obtained from the estimation of a VECM fixed-effect panel regression on daily 
changes in credit spreads from the credit default swap market (CDS), the bond market (BCS), the equity market 
(EIS) and the option market (OIS), based on equations (5) – (11). λji are the error correction terms. Regressions 
are estimated on a sample of 20 firms over three different periods, which include a pre-crisis period (January 
2006 – July 2007), the sub-prime crisis period (August 2007 – July 2009) and the sovereign crisis period 
(August 2009 – December 2012). P-values less than 5% are indicated in bold. 
Dep.Var. 
∆CDSt ∆BCSt ∆EISt ∆OISt 
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period 
λ j1 -0.01 0.554 0.05 0.000 0.03 0.049 0.05 0.006 
λ j2 0.01 0.813 -0.14 0.000 -0.03 0.324 -0.06 0.089 
λ j3 0.00 0.407 0.01 0.000 -0.01 0.055 0.03 0.002 
Panel B: Sub-prime crisis 
λ j1 -0.06 0.193 -0.00 0.858 -0.00 0.792 -0.02 0.001 
λ j2 0.05 0.272 -0.04 0.005 -0.01 0.709 0.12 0.016 
λ j3 0.00 0.154 -0.00 0.924 -0.03 0.035 0.01 0.523 
Panel C: Sovereign crisis 
λ j1 -0.01 0.032 0.01 0.017 -0.00 0.294 0.11 0.636 
λ j2 -0.01 0.041 -0.03 0.000 0.01 0.111 0.12 0.137 
λ j3 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.000 -0.00 0.105 0.05 0.275 
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Table 7. Firm-specific price discovery analysis: VECM results 
This table reports the median coefficients of the error correction terms (λji) estimated from the individual 
VECMs of daily changes in credit default swap spreads (CDS), bond credit spreads (BCS), equity implied 
spreads (EIS) and option implied spreads (OIS) over the three sub-periods (Panel A), estimated with equations 
(5) – (11). In parentheses we indicate the absolute frequency of firms for which the error correction terms are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level and with correct sign. Panel B shows the mean value of the 
Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measure estimated as in Gonzalo and Granger (1995) across the 20 firms which are 
cointegrated over the whole sample period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Error correction  coefficients and their significance 
 
 
CSD and Option markets Bonds and Option markets Equity and Option markets 
 Median λ11 Median λ41 Median λ22 Median λ42 Median λ33 Median λ43 
Sample Pre-crisis period -0.01 (4) 0.01 (3) -0.08 (16) 0.00 (0) -0.01 (5) 0.04 (11) 
Sub-prime crisis -0.05 (13) -0.14 (0) -0.07 (15) 0.16 (7) -0.05 (18) 0.02 (3) 
Sovereign crisis -0.02 (8) -0.01 (2) -0.03 (18) 0.00 (0) -0.02 (12) 0.10 (16) 
 
Panel B: Gonzalo-Granger measure of price discovery 
  CDSs Bonds Equities Options 
Sample Pre-crisis period 0.40 0.10 0.42 0.25 
Sub-prime crisis 0.38 0.42 0.16 0.25 
Sovereign crisis 0.59 0.06 0.49 0.14 
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Table 8. Firm-specific price discovery analysis: VECM results by region 
This table reports the median coefficients of the error correction terms (λji) estimated from the individual 
VECMs of daily changes in credit default swap spreads (CDS), bond credit spreads (BCS), equity implied 
spreads (EIS) and option implied spreads (OIS) over the three sub-periods (Panel A for the US sample and Panel 
C for the European sample), estimated with equations (5) – (11). In parentheses we indicate the absolute 
frequency of firms for which the error correction terms are significantly different from zero at the 1% level and 
with correct sign. Panel B, for the US sample, and Panel D, for the European sample, show the mean value of 
the Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measure estimated as in Gonzalo and Granger (1995) across the firms which are 
cointegrated over the whole sample period for each region. Results are shown separately for the US and 
European samples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
US Sample 
Panel A: Error correction coefficients and their significance 
 
 
CSD and Option markets  Bonds and Option markets Equity and Option markets 
 Median λ11 Median λ41 Median λ22 Median λ42 Median λ33 Median λ43 
Sample Pre-crisis period -0.01 (2) 0.01 (2) -0.20 (10) 0.00 (0) -0.02 (3) 0.08 (6) 
Sub-prime crisis -0.06 (7) -0.30 (0) -0.21 (9) 0.14 (2) -0.06 (9) 0.02 (2) 
Sovereign crisis -0.02 (4) -0.01 (2) -0.15 (9) 0.00 (0) -0.01 (5) 0.10 (8) 
Panel B: Gonzalo-Granger measure of price discovery 
  CDSs Bonds Equities Options 
Sample Pre-crisis period 0.42 0.09 0.44 0.19 
Sub-prime crisis 0.57 0.19 0.19 0.27 
Sovereign crisis 0.39 0.04 0.55 0.16 
 
European Sample 
Panel C: Error correction coefficients and their significance 
 
 
CSD and Option markets Bonds and Option markets Equity and Option markets 
 Median λ11 Median λ41 Median λ22 Median λ42 Median λ33 Median λ43 
Sample Pre-crisis period -0.02 (2) 0.01 (1) -0.03 (6) 0.00 (0) -0.01 (2) 0.02 (5) 
Sub-prime crisis -0.04 (6) -0.01 (0) -0.03 (6) 0.20 (5) -0.04 (9) 0.02 (1) 
Sovereign crisis -0.02 (4) -0.01 (0) -0.02 (9) 0.01 (0) -0.02 (7) 0.10 (8) 
Panel D: Gonzalo-Granger measure of price discovery 
  CDSs Bonds Equities Options 
Sample Pre-crisis period 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.32 
Sub-prime crisis 0.20 0.65 0.13 0.20 
Sovereign crisis 0.80 0.07 0.42 0.12 
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Figure 1. Time series of credit spreads 
This figure shows time series of daily cross sectional median spreads obtained from the credit default swap 
market (CDS), the bond market (BCS), the equity market (EIS) and the option market (OIS) during the period 
2006-2012. 
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Price discovery of credit spreads in tranquil and crisis periods 
 
 
Highlights: 
 We study price discovery in credit spreads derived from four markets 
 We perform both a panel and a firm by firm analysis  
 Option implied spreads lead price discovery in crisis periods in the short term 
 The option market no longer has a prominent role in long term price discovery.  
